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No wonder that war effort was not successful whereas the one in Malaya was much more successful. Why does it matter? Why should you care about any of this and why should you be thinking about how one would defeat an insurgency? I was in Washington, D. We are out of Iraq, we are getting out of Afghanistan, and the armed forces are focussed on conventional warfare once again. They think that this ten-year episode of counterinsurgency was like a bad dream. They want to leave that behind. I wish that they could. I wish that their enemies would cooperate. That is the exact type of war that advanced militaries such as in Britain and the United States would love, they are great at it.

Unfortunately — I hate to report this — I am convinced that not all of our enemies are complete imbeciles. They are also capable of studying the lessons of history and they understand that fighting the United States military, the British military or the French military on a conventional battlefield is a losing game. They are not going to succeed that way. On the other hand, if they resort to regular warfare, they have a much greater chance of success.

So, bold prediction, I suspect exactly what they are going to do. In fact, it is what they are doing today. Because even though Osama bin Laden is dead, Al-Qaeda remains very much alive, as the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi on September 11 th of last year reminds us. In fact, not only is Al-Qaeda alive, but it has spread to lands like Mali, Libya and Syria where it was not present before.

Here is the really disturbing thought: groups like Al-Qaeda may be getting even more powerful in the future than they are today. One of the really worrisome trends of the last one hundred years is that the amount of killing power at the hands of the individual has been growing. A century ago, Western armies campaigning in the Third World were facing adversaries armed with often nothing more than bows and arrows, lancets and maybe a few muskets.

What can be in our future? Imagine if insurgents would get their hands on weapons of mass destruction. That would be a pretty terrifying thought as I am very much concerned that George Clooney may not be around to save us. I refer of course to the International Journal of Health Geographics. This is the issue if that will jog your memory.

This was a chart that was compiled by a team of scientists of what would happen if a twenty-kilotonne nuclear device would go off in downtown Manhattan. By the way, I hope you can appreciate how I am taking into account the audience here by showing you all what would happen in my home town and not in your home town if it was attacked by a nuclear weapon. In fact, the result would probably be very similar. Their calculation is that if a bomb went off here [ pointing to map ], the result would be roughly , dead and 1. I should add that a twenty-kilotonne device is not very powerful. It is about the same size of the bomb that went off in Nagasaki in Rome was brought down by its own Barbarians.

Today we face new Barbarians who are in many ways far more powerful. I will submit to you that the first line of defence is to understand the issue, to understand the history of insurgency and this is something I have tried to contribute to with the writing of this book. So with that, let me stop talking at you and have more of a two-way conversation.

Max, you certainly lived up to your promise of taking us through all that history in that very short space of time. We now have twenty five minutes for questions. Could you please give your name and where you are from, if you are from somewhere. I will take three at a time as I can see there are quite a few questions already. Thank you so much for your excellent talk. I think it was Mao Zedong who said that guerrillas are like fish that swim in the sea and need to have the popular local support.

Every guerrilla attack I can think of since , the guerrillas have won if not for this popular support. If you were advising the counterinsurgency right-wing regime that only had minority support, how would you go about doing it? The military chiefs wanted to use traditional conventional war, even after Vietnam, even after Afghanistan and I just wondered the degree as to which they simply are in denial about this method [ inaudible ].

These are all very good questions. Let me start with first — what would I advise a right-wing regime battling an insurgency with minority support? I would advise it to increase its support. Try to get the support of the majority. I think that would be very helpful for its long term cause. I would offer the same advice to a left-wing regime, by the way.

I would say any regime that is battling an insurgency needs to increase its popular support. Of course the issue with most regimes battling insurgencies is that the reason why you have an insurgency in the first place is because the regime tends to be very weak, corrupt and unpopular, much like the Batista regime in Cuba in the s. This was an issue that confronted the government of Afghanistan and as we speak today, it was very hard to do but it is also necessary because at the end of the day, insurgency and counter insurgency is fundamentally the battle of governments.

It is to see who can provide a better government to the people, the insurgents or the government. The second question was about conventional forces that employ irregular tactics and how they can move from one to another. The example that was given was the battle of Stalingrad. The Vietnamese communists, for example, used terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional methods by main force units which made them very hard to deal with, because if you wanted to deal with the guerrilla threat by the Viet Cong you had to disperse your forces among the population.

However, you would then leave them vulnerable to attack by Communist main force units. On the other hand, if you concentrated your forces on one half of the Communist main force units, you were leaving the population void of security and leaving them vulnerable to the work of the guerrillas of the Viet Cong. So these are very difficult issues to deal with, but we should keep in mind that many forces have not been strictly terrorists or guerrilla or conventional in their approach. Many have operated accross the entire spectrum of conflict.

These are to some extent divisions which we should be cognisant of the fact they are not always respected in the real world and often the threats come from many different directions. The question was asked if the military was in denial about this threat. Do they simply not want to face up to the prevalence and ubiquity and importance of the irregular warfare threat? The short answer is, yes. There is a tendency amongst all conventional militaries to want to focus on fighting other conventional militaries, whereas war among the people is dangerous, demeaning, protracted inglorious and not the usual kind of war.

It is very hard to get any conventional military force to focus on this threat, which is why the United States had so much trouble in the early years in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, because the military was not well prepared for the threat. When these wars went on, they did become superb counterinsurgent forces, but the danger is, after the war they immediately revert to the default mode which is what they did after Vietnam.

That is what I see happening today, which I think would be a tragic and foolish mistake for which some future military force is going to pay a very heavy price on some future battlefield. One of the things that historical perspectives do is at times revisit what people perceive what the outcome ought to be.

If you take the Vietnam War for example, when one might have thought that, coming from the perspective of people in the s, that it was a disaster. Today when we are in a battle of ideas between Communism and Capitalism, Capitalism has in fact prevailed. To what extent do you think you can revisit when you analyze the success and failures of insurgencies, in a longer historical perspective where you would get a different answer than you would have got at the time?

Throughout the Spring, most of the insurrectionists were local or national. It seems to me that with the media how it is today, we are now able to see international movements, and the religious war between the Shia and the Sunnis at the moment is one that cannot be addressed by conventional means, it must be addressed through public opinion and propaganda.

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The question is, how do you think it is being handled at the moment by the right-wing news agencies? I would like to turn it around. You talked about the barbarians of the day. Are we not the barbarians of the day, often in the Third World? Take Algeria. I have friends who remain in Algeria.

Why did we, the US, get involved in Vietnam and Iraq and why are we staying in Afghanistan after ? Is it not us who are the barbarians? Those are interesting and provocative questions. Let me start with the first one — if we can rethink the outcome of wars if they change over the course of decades. I think there is something to that. I visited Vietnam last summer and it was a very pleasant experience, the people were very nice.

They even renamed the Museum of War Atrocities something less in-your-face, which takes into account there is better strategic relations between the United States and Vietnam. There were tens of thousands more Vietnamese who became boat people. There was also the heavy cost of American disengagement which allowed the rise of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia which carried out genocide. There is also the tyranny and brutality that people in Vietnam had to endure for years until there was an open and a slightly more liberal approach from their government, which is made possible by the reorientation of policy, all very good.

Of course, judgements of events can change over the decades. The Vietnam War is one for which we paid a very heavy cost. There is no question that in other circumstances the verdict on success or failure can change over the course of decades, or even less than decades. There was a ninety percent drop in violence, which allowed the Iraqi political process to function again. But then we failed to keep troops there after , so there was no stabilising force in Iraqi politics. Today Prime Minister al-Maliki is acting increasingly as a sectarian Shiite who is driving Sunnis back into militancy and allowing Al-Qaeda in Iraq to rise from its grave.

A question was asked about international movements and how we deal with those today. You are absolutely right, that is one of the changes that have occurred in the last century. You only had the first international terrorist movement arrive in the late nineteenth century. Then in the s you had various leftist and nationalist groups who were provided some degree of coordination by the Stasi and by the Libyan security forces and others to become a transnational threat.

More recently, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda have taken it to a new level. They have figured out how to wage an insurgency in many different countries simultaneously and had to move many of their propaganda, fundraising and organising functions from physical space into cyberspace. They have been remarkably clever by using the internet, satellite, television and other mass media to run insurgencies in many different lands, which requires — as your question suggested — a much greater degree of international cooperation needed to combat insurgencies of the past and of course it also needs greater attention paid to the ideological basis of the insurgency, something I think we forget too often when we focus on drone strikes.

There is also too much on decapitating insurgent leadership, which I am in favour of. You can only do it by changing the climate in these various countries that allows this group to breed and to regenerate itself. That fundamentally requires having better security, stability and governance in many lands stretching to North Africa and the Middle East. This is a major challenge but it is one which I think we have to undertake if we are going to have any long term success against this deep-rooted and potent insurgency.

The third question was a great provocative one. Are we the barbarians at the gate? Sometimes I would admit, yes of course, Western forces can act in barbaric fashion. Abu Ghraib was a great example of that and the My Lai Massacre. There was no question that sometimes even our troops can act barbarically. However, on the whole I would say, in fact, no. The forces in the United States, Britain and in France are often the only thing standing between the local populations and the control of the merciless barbarians.

In fact, what you see in some of those countries like Mali, is that the people are very happy to be liberated from the grip of these Islamists and when the French came in, they greeted them with open arms. The same thing happened in Iraq in Al-Anbar province when the people turned against the oppressive rule of Al-Qaeda. The same thing happened in Afghanistan in , when the people welcomed Western intervention with open arms, so much that they….

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Alright, Sir, let me try to interject some reality into your interjection here. Yes, we did pay leaders of the Northern Alliance, but what I am talking about are the people of Afghanistan. Believe me, we did not pay off 30 million people to welcome us into Afghanistan and yet the great majority did because they hated the oppressive rule of the Taliban.

Subsequently, however, we screwed up as we allowed a security vacuum to develop and that allowed the Taliban to came back in with their campaign of terror. But now they are not that popular. They only are able to make any gains because of a governance of security vacuum that still exists in some parts of the country, particularly in the East. At the end of the day, what I find in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, Libya and many others is that the biggest reason why Western forces are unpopular is not what you think. It is not because they are there, it is because they are there and are not delivering on their promises of peace and security and democracy and economic development.

Believe me, the ordinary people in places like Afghanistan are terrified about the possibility of the Taliban returning, which will happen if we pull out too precipitously. It is utterly condemned and denounces the policy. May I just add that the last point you made. Bill Gates who gave a talk here, and he called these guys [ inaudible ], which really conveys the thing very well indeed….

I am going to have to stop you there. I think your question is about linguistics and how that works.

The long haul attention span for politicians is very short. How do we assure that they keep their focus on a foreign campaign, be it Iran or Afghanistan or wherever it is in the future, to firstly, maintain the support for the military, and secondly, to sustain public opinion on the home front? All empires fail. Would you not argue that the United States military is acting pathologically because if you look back in history, all nations spend a huge of their deficit on their arms and once they do that they start failing? This was true with the Roman and with the British empires. The United States empire is about to hit that point in about twenty years with their current deficit.

Moreover, some of the terrorists in those Paris attacks crossed French borders both before and after the incidents. The crossing of borders before, during, or after an attack is another characteristic of transnational terrorism. Both types of terrorism generate externalities—uncompensated costs or benefits—for individuals, who are not involved directly in the incident. Domestic terrorist attacks may result in higher insurance premiums for nontargeted firms, which correspond to a negative externality.

Moreover, the threat of domestic terrorism raises tax-supported homeland security spending, which also is an externality. Transnational terrorism leads to transnational externalities or uncompensated consequences that affect countries beyond the targeted countries. For example, terrorism in one or more trading partners results in tighter surveillance of exports that, in turn, raises the price to importing countries Bandyopadhyay et al. Terrorist attacks can disrupt the supply of imports, the flow of foreign direct investment, or the volume of tourism, all of which possess external cost components.

Gaibulloev and Sandler show that countries that take UN positions similar to those of the United States and its three major Western allies Britain, France, and Germany attract more terrorism. That affinity-generated terrorism represents an externality that is shown to be robust Dreher and Gassebner Based on micro-level evidence from Pakistan, Gaibulloev et al.

The study of political violence includes theoretical studies, cross-country empirical analyses, and micro-level empirical exercises. Garfinkel and Syropoulos present a purely theoretical investigation, whereas Arce offers a data-supported theoretical approach. Macro-level empirical articles include Maekawa et al. The former study applies pooled ordinary least squares regressions to the data; the latter study applies negative binomial regressions to panel data.

Generally, micro-level studies rely on event or survey data, gathered from different within-country locations. More commonly, micro-level analyses involve single-country surveys as in the studies by Piazza of the Palestinian Territories, by Braithwaite et al. Such within-country, micro-level analyses help avoid identification problems arising from cross-country dependence. Micro-level data may derive from already administered surveys or from author-generated surveys. If the authors do not ask the right revealing questions in original surveys, then their subsequent analysis may yield insignificant results, leading to a waste of time and money.

Concerns may arise when a large number of respondents decline to answer sensitive questions, which serve as the dependent variables for testing various hypotheses. Currently, a huge divide exists between macro- and micro-level studies. Macro-level studies of large panels of countries may be plagued by cross-country dependence and identification difficulties.

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Thus, researchers face a tradeoff when choosing between macro- and micro-level studies of political violence. What is the way forward to using both types of studies? For macro-level studies, methods namely, factor augmentation have been developed for adjusting for cross-sectional dependence Gaibulloev et al. Additionally, identification strategies primarily include the development and use of instruments. To establish the sought-after generalization of micro-level country studies, a researcher first should look at the regional level to match another country on key variables with those of the studied country.

That exercise is a first-cut attempt at generalization in which the uncovered findings are sought in a carefully matched regional partner. A validating second-cut effort is to conduct more follow-up micro-level studies on well-matched countries to test empirically whether or not the generalization holds. Further thought must be given to comparing macro- and micro-level studies, especially at the regional level where countries share many important characteristics in terms of ethnic composition, location, social factors, geo-climatic conditions, resources, and economic considerations.

Gaibulloev and Sandler investigates whether countries that adopt foreign policy positions similar to those of prime-target Western nations—the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—are in greater peril for terrorism. That article carries forward the pioneering work of Dreher and Gassebner , which shows that countries whose voting behaviors in the UN General Assembly are more closely correlated with that of the United States attracted more transnational terrorist attacks. The current study ventures beyond that earlier effort in a number of essential ways.

First, Gaibulloev and Sandler use an ideal-points affinity indicator, along with the standard affinity measure, to establish the robustness of the affinity-terrorism nexus. The ideal-points affinity index distinguishes better between agenda and preference changes than the standard affinity measure. The latter indicator merely correlates UN General Assembly votes between the United States and those of another country.

Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare | Forecasts and Remedies | Taylor & Francis Group

Second, Gaibulloev and Sandler apply alternative measures of terrorism that include transnational, domestic, and casualty-based attacks; the affinity-terrorism relationship is robust for these alternative measures. Third, Gaibulloev and Sandler include political affinity with the United States, political affinity with three major US allies Britain, France, and Germany , and political affinity with the United States and its three allies.

Fourth, Gaibulloev and Sandler establish that political affinity with the United States also results in more attacks on US interests abroad. As such, counterterrorism measures must protect US assets at home and in countries with US-aligned foreign policies. Gaibulloev and Sandler estimate fixed-effects negative binomial regressions for countries and ten 5-year periods, commencing in the late s and concluding in Political orientation to Western foreign policy is shown to have costs in terms of larger and deadlier transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. As a consequence, political affinity generates far more serious consequences than first reported by Dreher and Gassebner Moreover, the political-affinity-inspired attacks also are entangled with the foreign policies of the three major US allies.

The second article is the only pure theoretical exercise in the special issue. Garfinkel and Syropoulos develop a one-period, full-information, guns-versus-butter scenario with two asymmetric rivals who vie for control over an insecure portion of their aggregate butter civilian good output.

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These agents can resolve their dispute through peaceful bargaining involving a resource transfer from the poorer to the richer country, or through war involving a resource transfer from the vanquished to the victor. The choice of war or peace is made in advance of the arming choice, but after the resource transfer. With asymmetric adversaries, the better-armed rival is more likely to win a war, which is determined by a lottery contest success function.

War destroys some of the contested, insecure butter output. If sufficiently severe, output destruction may make peaceful settlement more desirable. However, peace results in no reduction in butter.

Three myths of battling terrorism

The rich agent prefers war unless the associated destruction is too large. Hence, output security is not necessarily supportive of peace. Moreover, uncertainty is not needed as a cause of war. Their game-theoretic model is simple, elegant, and empirically predictive. One such application is to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations associated with the Oslo Accords in Garfinkel and Syropoulos Given its simple framework, the model can be extended in a number of directions.

To ascertain how much to spend on counterterrorism, a targeted country must know the consequences of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks on home soil.

Those consequences include human costs, material losses, and political ramifications. Most terrorism event datasets—e. Arce offers a thoughtful exercise at quantifying the human costs of terrorist attacks by greatly extending the earlier efforts of Sandler et al. Those earlier studies primarily quantified the human costs of bombings, which generally account for half of all terrorist attacks Enders and Sandler ; Gaibulloev and Sandler Arce presents the death and injury tolls associated with alternative types of bombings, mass shootings, combined shootings and explosions, and vehicular assaults.

In his study, bombings involve various venues and modes, such as confined spaces, open spaces, suicide attacks, vehicular deliveries car and truck bombs , structural collapses, and structural fires. Arce allows an attack mode to generate multiple injuries, such as primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary blast injuries. Those injuries may include damage to the lungs, tympanic membranes, thorax, abdomen, spine, limbs, head, and neck. In addition, mental disorders e.

What is most important, Arce controls for baseline incidences of morbidity and mortality in attack venues—not all injuries and deaths from, e. His calculations show that mass shootings, combined shootings and explosions, and suicide bombings account for the largest DALLs in descending order. Vehicular assaults, a recent form of attack, have the fourth largest DALL. Injuries significantly raise the human consequences of terrorism and the subsequent justification for counterterrorism policies.

However, one must remember that the material and political costs of transnational terrorism are not included in his analysis. Moreover, many modes of terrorism e. Maekawa et al. This time, it reaches all of the solution to the top degrees of strength. Read e-book online Violent Politics: Requiem fur eine Stadt. Dort, wo seit unvordenklichen Zeiten Kultur geschaffen und gepflegt wurde, haben Dschihadisten mit dem Baal-Tempel ein einzigartiges antikes Bauwerk gesprengt. Extortion involves applying pressure to induce a person who has a legitimate key to it to transfer or release the money.

A new and developing art form is the disposal and laundering of this money. One way is through conversion into drugs, which have become an international currency with a huge circulation and, after a few transactions, almost impossible to trace. Another way is through multiple transfers between international banks. An extortionist may make the acceptance of a ransom or blackmail payment conditional on its being electronically transferred to a named bank in a foreign country, or perhaps split between many different banks in different countries.

Another development, which may well go further, is the use of caseless ammunition, obviating the need to eject a cartridge. An attempt has been made to develop a gun in which everything, including bullets, screws, springs, and firing mechanisms, is non-metallic. And the development of night vision equipment—infra-red IR , image intensification II , and thermal imagery TI —will also have an increasing effect on the options available for the use of weapons in attack and defence.

But sophisticated night vision sights can cost ten times as much as the weapon itself.